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GARY PREVOST
Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution
The life of Fidel Castro is inextricably bound up with the story of the Cuban Revo-
lution. In modern times no revolutionary movement is more identified with a single 
person. However, it would be a serious mistake to reduce the Cuban Revolution to 
the story of Fidel Castro. Countless analysts, especially within the ranks of the U.S. 
government, have made that error. This essay will seek to briefly tell the story of Fidel 
Castro and the revolution that he has led for more than fifty years. The author will 
conclude that Fidel Castro has left his mark on Cuban life in a way that will likely 
endure well after his death, whenever that comes.
Fidel Castro Ruz was born on August 13, 1926 on his family’s sugar plantation near 
Biran, Oriente province. His father, originally an immigrant laborer from Galicia, 
Spain had become the owner of a 23-acre plantation. As a boy he worked on his fam-
ily’s sugarcane fields. However, unlike many young Cubans of that time, he received 
an excellent education at Jesuit institutions, Colegio La Salle and Colegio Dolopes in 
Santiago and finally Colegio Belen in Havana, where he was voted the school’s best 
athlete, mainly on the basis of his baseball prowess. Castro continued his education at 
the University of Havana where he worked on a law degree. 
During his years in law Fidel was active in politics, including participation in an 
attempt to overthrow the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic in 1947. 
He escaped capture and returned to Havana to complete his degree in 1950. That 
year, he entered a small law firm that defended the poor and people with political dif-
ficulties. By this time Fidel’s political affiliation was with the Orthodox Party, which 
positioned itself against Fulgencio Batista’s Authentic Party. The Orthodox Party, un-
der the leadership of Eduardo Chibas, believed that the Authentic Party, riddled with 
corruption, had betrayed the ideals of the Revolution of 1934 when it came to power 
in an overthrow of the Machado dictatorship. In 1940, Cuba had adopted a progres-
sive constitution that guaranteed labor rights, but after World War II the Authentic 
Party under Batista’s leadership turned to the right and became corrupt as it welcomed 
North American mobsters into Cuba’s tourist industry. 
Fidel Castro was projected to be an Orthodox candidate for Congress in the 1952 
elections, but those elections were cancelled by Batista and never held. Castro went to 
court and charged the dictator with violating the constitution, but the Court rejected 
the petition. It is at this point that Fidel began his career as a revolutionary leader. He 
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organized, together with his brother Raul, 165 men and women who carried out an 
armed attack on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953. 
The attack was intended to spark a general insurrection throughout the island, but it 
failed miserably. Half of the attackers were killed; Castro and his brother Raul were 
taken prisoner. The date of this attack would become the name of their revolution-
ary movement and since 1959, July 26 has been celebrated as Cuba’s most important 
national holiday and the occasion of a major speech by Fidel. 
During his trial, Castro made an impassioned critique of the Batista regime and 
called for greater political and social liberties. Known as the “History Will Absolve 
Me” speech, it became the rallying cry of the July 26th Movement. On May 15, 1955 
Batista declared a general amnesty and the Castro brothers were released, but they in 
no way renounced their desire to overthrow Batista. Over the next eighteen months 
Fidel traveled to the United States and Mexico to organize the July 26th Movement. 
In Mexico, Argentinean doctor Ernesto “Che” Guevara joined the movement and on 
December 2, 1956 they set sail for Cuba in an aging yacht, the Granma, purchased 
from an American couple. 
RETURN TO CUBA
The 82 men launched an attack in the Oriente province that was to be timed with 
an insurrection in Santiago led by Frank Pais. However, like the attack five years ear-
lier, it was a total failure. Only twelve of the original attackers survived, but they suc-
ceeded in fleeing into the remote Sierra Maestra mountains to continue their struggle. 
From the mountain stronghold, called La Plata, the revolutionaries built a base camp 
that included a primitive radio transmitter, and went about the task of organizing a 
movement against Batista. The movement reached out to the local peasantry promis-
ing land reform, education, and democracy. Literacy classes were conducted for the 
local population. One by one locals were recruited to the movement and a campaign 
of guerrilla warfare was begun against local army outposts. Most attacks were success-
ful and the needed additional weaponry was stolen from the army. 
The actions of the July 26th Movement became well known in Cuba and within the 
hemisphere. The latter recognition was achieved when a New York Times reporter, Her-
bert Matthew, welcomed into the rebels’ camp, wrote a series of sympathetic articles 
portraying Castro as a modern-day Robin Hood. Meanwhile, revolutionary actions 
were occurring elsewhere in the country. The student-led Revolutionary Directorate 
narrowly missed an assassination of Batista in March 1957. However, following the 
failed attempt the Directorate was severely repressed, leaving Castro’s forces as the 
primary anti-Batista force. 
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In the summer of 1958, the rebels left their camps and began a general offensive 
against Batista’s army. The decisive battle occurred at the end of December in Santa 
Clara under the leadership of Che Guevara where a key unit of Batista’s army surren-
dered en masse. Fidel’s column captured Santiago and from the balcony of that city 
hall Castro declared the victory of the Cuban revolution on January 1, 1959, as Batista 
had fled into exile the previous evening. 
The tri umph of the July 26th Movement was a complex phenomenon as was the role 
of Fidel Castro. It was not a mass-based revolutionary war by a peasant army like those 
that occurred in China or Vietnam. Peasants were recruited to the July 26th Move-
ment and gave it important support, but the guerrilla army, 800 as late as Sep tember 
1958, was primarily a force of students, professionals, and workers from Cuba’s middle 
sectors. The Cuban insurrection was not an urban pro letarian revolution. Organized 
labor, whose ranks were heavily influenced by the Communist Party (PS), opposed 
the July 26th Movement until al most the very end, when the communists gave their 
belated support. 
The July 26th Movement also carried out a broad alliance strategy that culminated in 
a July 1958 meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, where the Revo lutionary Democratic Civ-
ic Front was organized, encompassing almost all of the anti-Batista forces. The front, 
combined with the military weakening of Batista, eroded U.S. government support 
for the regime. In March 1958, un der pressure from the Senate, the U.S. State Depart-
ment placed an arms em bargo on Cuba. In December the Eisenhower administration 
repeatedly placed pressure on Batista to step down. However, the U.S. opposition to 
Batista was predicated on the assumption that the moderate anti-Batista forces would 
dominate the new government. That assumption proved to be erroneous. 
REVOLUTION IN POWER
On January 8, 1959, Fidel Castro and the July 26th Movement entered Ha vana. 
He noted that the U.S. military had prohibited the Liberator Army un der General 
Calixto García from entering Santiago de Cuba in 1898 and com mented that his-
tory would not be repeated. Castro took no position in the new government but set 
about consolidating Cuba’s military forces under his command. He sent one of his 
trusted lieutenants, Camilo Cienfuegos, to relieve Barquín, who had taken command 
of Batista’s remaining troops. Forces of the directorate initially refused to disarm and 
had to be forcefully persuaded to accept Castro’s authority. 
Castro and his allies from the Sierra Maestra were committed to a pro gram of radi-
cal social and economic reform, and they soon set out on a course to consolidate 
control over state power. The victory over Batista came so quickly that most of the 
old political structures were intact. Only a few thou sand of Batista’s closest allies left 
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the country. Most of the landowning elite, businesspeople, professionals, and clergy 
stayed hoping that they could in fluence the course of the new government, protecting 
their considerable priv ileges. Well aware that their radical plans would encounter stiff 
resistance among those committed to only minor change, Castro and his allies moved 
to isolate his opponents one by one. 
In mid-February 1959 Fidel accepted the position of prime minister and began to 
push through measures that would distribute wealth and increase support in the rural 
areas. In May, an agricultural reform act limited the size of most farm holdings to 
under 1,000 acres. This measure destroyed the largest holdings, including U.S.-owned 
sugar properties, several of which exceeded 400,000 acres. Land was dis tributed to 
thousands of rural workers, and the government moved to im prove conditions on 
the large farms it now controlled. As a result, support for the revolution increased 
throughout the countryside. The passage of the Rent Reduction Act resulted in the 
transfer of about 15 percent of the na tional income from property owners to wage 
workers and peasants. A literacy campaign sent thousands of young volunteers to rural 
areas. Literacy was increased, and the young supporters of the revolution learned first-
hand about the conditions of the rural areas. 
The government also be gan building hundreds of new schools and training thou-
sands of additional teachers. Health care was extended to the entire population for the 
first time with the construction of rural clinics and hospitals. Many private and racially 
segregated facilities such as clubs and beaches were opened to the public. These radi-
cal social and economic measures carried out in the first year of the revolution often 
involved mass mobilizations, which served to unite the poor majority of Cuban citi-
zens behind the government. These measures also served to identify the movement’s 
political enemies, who exposed themselves through their vociferous opposition to the 
changes. 
Moderates in the government, such as acting President Manuel Urrutia, resigned in 
protest in June 1959, taking much of the leadership of the old democratic parties and 
landed elite into exile with them. Simultaneously, the use of revolutionary tribunals 
to judge and then execute approximately 500 members of Batista’s police and secu-
rity agencies was popular with the Cuban masses but forced many of those who had 
been associated with the old regime to seek refuge abroad. One by one those political 
forces that opposed the radical direction of the revolution dropped away until only 
the revolutionary core remained, primarily the cadre of the July 26th Movement from 
the Sierra Maestra and a few allies from the Revolutionary Directorate who increas-
ingly assumed key cabinet posts and took control of the government bureaucracy. The 
final element in the revolutionary coalition was the Cuban Communist Party (PSP). 
Castro forged a formal alliance with them in late 1959, not com pletely trusting them, 
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but desirous of using their organizational skills in the reconstructed government bu-
reaucracies. Their inclusion in the government also served to drive out the remaining 
anti-communist elements. 
The increasingly radical direction of the revolution in 1959–1960 led to a direct 
confrontation with Washington. The U.S. government had first begun to realize that 
it had a potential major problem with Cuba when Castro left Washington follow-
ing a visit in 1959 without requesting significant U.S. aid. Up until that point U.S. 
officials had expected to control Cuba through the normal give-and-take of foreign 
aid. By April 1959 the Cuban leadership had already decided on a series of radical 
changes in Cuba and were not seeking approval in Washington. At the time Castro left 
Washington, Cuba still maintained the Batista policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet 
Union. However, this policy began to change, and in December 1959 an official So-
viet journalist was admitted to Havana. In February 1960 USSR First Deputy Premier 
Anastasias Mikoyan paid a visit, and a Soviet–Cuban trade agreement was signed. Che 
Guevara went to Eastern Europe soon after and lined up $100 million in credits for 
industrialization in Cuba. Relations with the Soviet Union offered a balance and an 
alternative to dominance of Amer ican power in Cuban affairs. Formal diplomatic rela-
tions were reestablished between the two countries in May 1960. 
The Cuban economy depended on sugar. A U.S. quota system had allo cated Cuba 
a 2.8-million-ton market at a predetermined and subsidized price considerably above 
the world market. This amounted to significant U.S. gov ernmental aid to Cuba. One 
of the first actions of friendship by the Soviet Union was the February 1960 purchase 
of Cuban sugar. As United States–Cuba relations worsened, the USSR agreed to pur-
chase 2.7 million tons of Cuban sugar if the American government reduced its quota. 
The Soviet Union also began to supply Cuba with oil. Cuba has a small domestic sup-
ply of petroleum, but only enough to meet about 15 percent of national needs. With 
a shortage of foreign exchange, Cuba found it increasingly diffi cult to keep refineries 
supplied with imported oil, mostly from Venezuela. In April 1960 the first shipment 
of Soviet oil arrived in exchange for Cuban products. American oil companies, which 
owned Cuba’s refineries, advised by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, refused to refine 
the oil. The refiner ies were taken over by the Cuban government, and Washington 
responded by eliminating Cuba’s sugar quota, the backbone of the Cuban economy. 
The confrontation between Havana and Washington had been building throughout 
1959 and 1960. The Cuban government began regulating the U.S.-owned Cuban 
Telephone Company in March 1959. The confrontation over the oil refineries re-
sulted in the first nationalizations in July 1960, and they were followed quickly by 
the seizure of U.S.-owned sugar plantations in August, foreign banks in September, 
and more businesses in October. Late in 1960 the United States broke diplomatic 
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relations with Cuba, and in Jan uary 1961 the Eisenhower administration instituted 
an embargo on most ex ports to Cuba. The Agrarian Reform Law of May 1959 laid 
the groundwork for eventual seizure of many large American properties with an offer 
of twenty-year bonds for payment; the United States, rejecting the bonds, de manded 
“prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.” By December 1959 the CIA began 
to recruit Cuban exiles, and in March 1960 Eisenhower de cided to arm and train an 
exile force for the purpose of invading the island and precipitating the overthrow of 
the Castro government. 
John Kennedy assumed the presidency of the United States in January 1961 and 
with it the responsibility for the group of Cuban exiles, now train ing in Central Amer-
ica under CIA direction. In Cuba, Castro had inaugu rated the Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution (CDR), organized block by block in the cities, to guard 
against opposition and to enlist sup port for the government. In the mountains of 
Escambray a group of anti-Castro guerrillas maintained harassment of government 
troops, but at U.S. request they stopped action until the exile forces were ready. In 
April the exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs but were stalled by local militias, while 
in the cities the CDRs quickly pointed out persons in opposition, who were immedi-
ately arrested before any of them could support the invasion. The major result of the 
American intervention was the consolidation of Cas tro’s position by creating a solid 
identification between the anti-imperialism of Cuban tradition and the victory of the 
forces under Fidel Castro. 
1970 SUGAR HARVEST
Soon af ter the defeat of the exile force at the Bay of Pigs, Castro declared the “so-
cialist” character of the Cuban revolution. Socialist countries supported Cuba, with 
the USSR honoring its promise to buy 2.7 million tons of sugar. The People’s Republic 
of China bought a million tons; other socialist nations, 300,000 tons. 
From the declared commitment to socialism in April 1961 to the campaign to pro-
duce 10 million tons of sugar cane in 1970 the Cuban revolution moved through 
its most idealistic period. Domestically the revolution sought to cre ate a thoroughly 
home-grown socialist economy marked primarily by lack of market incentives. Shared 
sacrifice and a drive for self-sufficiency were the primary driving forces in economic 
development. The leadership sought to diversify the Cuban economy while instituting 
a policy of industrializa tion. New products such as cotton were introduced to the is-
land with the hope of reducing the island’s dependency on foreign inputs. At the time 
of the revolution the United States had $1 billion invested in Cuba. U.S. com panies 
controlled 40 percent of the sugar crop and 55 percent of the sug armill capacity; more 
importantly, the United States was the major buyer of Cuban sugar. In return for 
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preferential entry of its sugar into U.S. markets Cuba was required to open its market 
to U.S. manufactured goods; this undercut the development of domestic industries. 
There were numerous dis tortions — Cuba exported raw sugar but imported candy. It 
produced vast quantities of tobacco but imported cigarettes. Cuban economic policy 
of the 1960s was designed to reverse this reality. The determination to end de pendence 
on sugar production took the extreme form of plowing over vast acreage of sugar lands 
and planting new crops, but these efforts largely failed due to the lack of expertise and 
appropriate climatic conditions. 
During the 1960s the Cuban government also borrowed a strategy of heavy indus-
trialization from the Soviet Union, but these efforts yielded only lim ited success be-
cause of Cuba’s particular conditions and the lack of trained personnel. Following the 
failure of the “balanced growth” model Cuba turned to an approach labeled the “turn-
pike model.” Instead of seeking to diversify the economy immediately, Cuba would 
give priority to sugar pro duction by increasing the cultivated acreage and increasing 
mechanization. Earnings from sugar export would be used to import machinery to 
diver sify agricultural and industrial production on a sounder basis. Other sectors were 
also developed, especially the production of cattle, fishing, and citrus fruit. Cement, 
nickel, and electricity were also expanded with assistance of machinery from the Soviet 
Union. 
During this period (1964–1970) the na tionalization of the Cuban economy was 
completed. All industry, commerce, and finance and 70 percent of agricultural land 
were controlled by the state. This period was marked by a great ideological debate over 
socialist eco nomic strategy. The basic question debated was whether a largely under-
developed country like Cuba could primarily use moral incentives to moti vate greater 
productivity in the workforce or whether it was necessary to use some sort of mate-
rial incentives. Cuban Communist leader Carlos Rafael Rodríguez argued that given 
Cuba’s low level of development, the workers could not be expected to have sufficient 
consciousness for appeals to the good of the society; increased productivity needed to 
be rewarded with higher wages and bonuses. This “market socialism” position was also 
ad vocated by Soviet advisers. 
The more radical position, argued by Guevara, was that economic orga nization 
could be totally centralized with resources allocated to enterprises according to plan 
rather than market forces. Central to this argument was that workers could be moti-
vated without material incentives to work for the collective, the common good. Af-
ter some experimentation with both mod els, Castro endorsed Guevara’s approach in 
1966 and that period culminated in the revolutionary offensive of 1968–1970, which 
focused on a large-scale investment in sugar with the aim of harvesting and process-
ing 10 million tons of sugar in 1970. The concentration of resources on production 
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entailed further sacrifices from the populace, but the primary goal was to finance 
in dustrialization without further debt. It was also hoped that the success of the cam-
paign would be paid off in higher levels of production throughout the society from 
increased industrialization. 
The 1970 sugar harvest was a massive undertaking that involved work ers from all 
sectors and volunteers from around the world; although close to 10 million tons were 
cut, major processing problems cut the final harvest to 8.5 million tons, far short of 
the goal. It was a significant blow to the pres tige of the revolution, and production 
dropped in several key sectors out side of sugar. The failure of the revolutionary of-
fensive led to a reassess ment of the goals and strategies of the revolution in economic 
development as well as in other areas. It was recognized that more attention had to 
be paid to productivity, perhaps at the sacrifice of some egalitarian goals. It was also 
realized that economic independence from the Soviet Union could not be achieved in 
the short run. 
SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS
Concurrent with the changing economic realities, the end of the 1960s brought 
some changes on the international front. During the 1960s the Cuban leadership 
advocated an uncompromising stance toward Latin American elites and the United 
States. Castro’s Second Declaration of Havana saw rev olution as inevitable in Latin 
America due to class oppression, economic ex ploitation, and oligarchical domination 
by pro-U.S. repressive regimes. Ha vana sympathized with such prospects and saw it as 
“the duty of every revolutionary to make the revolution.” As a strategy Castro called 
for armed revolution on a continental scale. The Cubans gave direct material support 
to revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia. 
Guevara, a leader of Cuba’s own revolution, went to fight in Bo livia, where he was 
killed in 1967. 
Two conferences during this era epito mized the commitment of the Cuban leader-
ship to the strategy of revolu tionary guerrilla warfare. In 1966 Castro convened the 
Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where, 
in his keynote speech, the Cuban leader attacked U.S. imperialism, Latin Ameri can 
elite governments, and all political movements that opposed the neces sity of armed 
struggle, including communist parties. The strategy of guer rilla warfare was confirmed 
at the Latin America Solidarity Conference the following year in Havana. While this 
strategy struck a responsive chord among revolutionaries throughout the Americas, 
the policy did isolate Cuba within the hemisphere. Its support for armed guerrilla 
movements made normal relations with most governments in Latin America impos-
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sible and even served to bring Castro in conflict with significant Leftist forces in the 
region. Castro directly attacked the reform-oriented approach of the region’s com-
munist parties as a betrayal of revolutionary principles. Most commu nist parties in 
the hemisphere had renounced armed struggle as a viable strategy for power and were 
pursuing reforms within existing Latin Amer ican political structures. 
DECADE OF THE 1970S — ECONOMIC CHANGES
The decade of the 1970s in Cuba saw a more sober approach to economic policy 
making, internal governance, and foreign affairs. In hindsight, this was the decade 
where the Cuban revolution was successfully institutional ized. The longevity of the 
Cuban revolutionary project was secured in a se ries of crucial policy shifts following 
the failure of the sugar harvest. As a starting point, the party and Castro himself took 
full responsibility for the shortfall. Furthermore, there was no significant scapegoating, 
nor did the events result in a purge of party leadership; the response to the failure was 
policy initia tives in economics and politics that were probably long overdue. More-
over, the changes were not instituted hastily but rather introduced gradually over the 
course of the next decade. 
The changes in the economic arena were considerable. The failure of the economic 
projects of the 1960s led the Cuban leadership to con clude reluctantly that the only 
viable economic strategy was to move toward economic integration with the East Eu-
ropean Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This was a difficult decision 
for the revolutionary leaders because it meant that the diversification of the Cuban 
economy they had so des perately sought in the 1960s would have to be placed largely 
on hold. Inte gration into the CMEA meant that Cuba would primarily concentrate 
on the production of sugar, nickel, and citrus products in return for oil, manufac tured 
goods, and canned foods. This arrangement worked in large measure because Cuba 
received a guaranteed return for its exported primary prod ucts, something it likely 
could not have obtained in the open world capital ist market. 
Cuba received an especially favorable exchange rate on Soviet oil for its sugar. This 
arrangement essentially shielded Cuba from the dra matic rise in world energy prices 
that occurred between 1973 and 1982, devastating many Third World economies. The 
Soviet demand for Cuban sugar was high, and by the early 1980s Cuba was import-
ing more Soviet oil than it needed, permitting the resale of millions of barrels into the 
world mar ket for hard currency. This export of oil became a valuable project for Cuba 
and allowed for the further raising of the Cuban standard of living. By the mid-1980s, 
85 percent of Cuba’s export–import was with the CMEA countries. The only major 
trade that remained with the capitalist world was the prized Cuban tobacco. Dur-
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ing this period Cuba did not abandon its goal of in creasing food self-sufficiency and 
developing more domestic industries, but inevitably these efforts did take a back seat 
to meeting the production goals for the economic activity with the East. 
The growing certainty of the economic deals made with the CMEA on a multiyear 
basis allowed for a new emphasis on planning that included the reactivation of the 
state Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN). Prices and in vestments were centrally 
controlled, although in the 1970s there was some decentralization of economic plan-
ning to local and regional authorities. Without great fanfare there was also a shift away 
from the 1960s emphasis on solely moral incentives toward the use of material incen-
tives to raise 1evels of production. The shift clearly had ideological overtones that were 
wel comed by the Soviet advisers, but the change also occurred because unlike in the 
1960s, the improved state of the economy gave the government a much greater ability 
to carry out a program of worker bonuses. 
Even with all of these changes, the period of 1970–1989 was not one of unbroken 
progress for the Cuban economy. After a brief period of accelerated growth in the early 
1970s the first five-year plan (1975–1980) fell far short of its goals. The economy did 
grow again in the first half of the 1980s, buoyed in part by the profitable re-export 
of Soviet oil during a period of high world oil prices. Throughout this period there 
continued to be problems of lower than ex pected worker productivity. 
During this time, because of its primary export orientation, the Cuban consumer 
did not always benefit directly from the overall growth of the economy but the wealth 
redistribution policies of the revolution did result in a sig nificant sharing of the ben-
efits of CMEA membership. In 1970 virtually all consumer goods were rationed, but 
by the mid-1980s only 30 percent of in come was being spent on rationed goods and 
by 1989 the ration had been all but eliminated. By the end of the 1980s, Cuba had 
constructed one of the most egalitarian societies in the world, free of the malnutrition 
and hunger that marked most of its Central American and Caribbean neighbors. How-
ever, even at Cuba’s height, the Cuban consumer still suffered from a lack of variety 
and quality of goods available to buy. When the economic shocks of 1989 intervened, 
Cuba had not yet achieved a fully developed socialist economy. 
AFTER THE FALL OF THE WALL
Dramatic changes began in Cuba with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989 and were accelerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. 
These events impacted Cuba so strongly because at the beginning of 1989 virtually 
all of Cuba’s foreign trade (87 percent) was with the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries of CMEA. Cuba was dependent on CMEA for most of the country’s energy 
supplies, fertilizer, machine tools, and canned foods. The CMEA arrangement to pur-
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chase Cuban sugar, nickel, and other primary production had given Cuba significant 
economic and social progress after 1970, but the sudden and unexpected loss of these 
mar kets wrecked the Cuban economy. In 1989 Cuba imported 13 million tons of oil 
from the Soviet Union, but by 1992 it was able to import only 6 mil lion tons, all of 
it at world market prices. The importing of canned food from Eastern Europe was 
ended altogether. By 1993 Cuba had lost 75 percent of its import capacity, and the 
country’s economic activity contracted by 50 percent. Outside of the context of war, 
no modern economy had been so devastated in the twentieth century. The destruction 
of the economy resulted in the return of rationing for basic necessities. Rationing was 
not new to rev olutionary Cuba, but in the 1980s it had been largely eliminated and 
a sys tem of “parallel markets” allowed consumers to add to the food available in the 
subsidized state markets. Since these “parallel markets” depended to a large measure 
on food imported from Eastern Europe, they disappeared virtually overnight in 1991 
as rationing was reintroduced. 
The return to a ration was clearly a setback for Cuba, but it also meant that the 
country was not abandoning its socialist principles. The hardships were to be shared, 
and no one was to be left on his or her own. The equi table rationing of goods was 
in stark contrast to most of the rest of Latin America, where “structural adjustment 
programs” often resulted in food prices beyond the means of the majority who are 
poor and in subsequent malnu trition. In addition to rations, other dramatic measures 
were introduced to rescue the economy and maintain the productivity of the people. 
To main tain food production in the context of fuel shortages, more than 80,000 oxen 
were imported to take the place of tractors. The stated goal was food self- sufficiency, 
but that was unlikely as ownership patterns initially remained the same and no signifi-
cant incentives were introduced. In an attempt to deal with the dramatic reduction 
in public transportation, 600,000 bicycles were imported from China into a country 
where there was no tradition of cycling. In Havana the conservation of electricity was 
quite dramatic, with power shut off for a period of time each day in each neighbor-
hood. To earn immediate hard currency, a program to dramatically increase the tour-
ism industry was implemented despite the social problems, such as drugs and prosti-
tution, that came along with it. From just a $165 million industry in 1989, tourism 
revenues grew to $850 million in five years as successful for eign investments in new 
facilities were attracted from Europe and Latin America. 
Parallel to the tourism expansion in the early 1990s was Cuba’s attempt to cash in 
on the extensive long-term investments it had made in medical technology. Two prod-
ucts in particular were marketed — a hepatitis-B vac cine and an anti-stroke medicine. 
Cuba targeted Third-World markets with some modest successes in the $200-mil-
lion-per-year range, but the compe tition in the markets with U.S. and European mul-
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tinationals made signifi cant inroads in the arena difficult. In 1992–1993 Cuba also 
stabilized trade relations with its formerly socialist partners in Russia and the other 
former Soviet republics. Initially it appeared that the Russians would totally turn their 
backs on Cuba out of deference to the West, but when large-scale West ern aid for 
the Russians did not materialize, Cuba and Russia signed new trade agreements that 
continue on a much reduced scale the bartering of Russian oil for Cuban sugar, an 
economic arrangement that benefits both countries. Russia also continues to pay for 
a radar installation in Cuba against the wishes of the United States, although the last 
Soviet troops left the is land in 1993. At the height of the Cold War there had been 
40,000 Russian troops in Cuba. 
To spur foreign investment, changes were made in Cuban law to allow full recovery 
of investments in three years and relatively easy repatriation of profits. Taxation in the 
first years of investment was also sharply reduced. Latin American businesspeople, par-
ticularly Mexicans, were seriously courted by the Cuban government. An early fruit of 
this initiative was the decision by Domos, a Mexican telecommunication company, to 
invest heav ily in updating the Cuban phone system. By 1994 over 150 foreign-Cuban 
joint ventures were underway, comprising more than $1.5 billion invested from many 
other countries, including Spain, Canada, Germany, and Israel. The bulk of the activ-
ity was in tourism, where investors have insisted on a quick turnaround of profits in 
hard currency, thus limiting the positive impact on the economy. These efforts have 
been limited by the aggressive efforts of the U.S. government to prevent foreign busi-
ness investment in Cuba. First the Torricelli Bill in 1992 and then the Helms-Burton 
legislation of 1996 tight ened the long-term U.S. embargo on Cuba by punishing firms 
that make in vestments on the island. Although the legislation, especially Helms-Bur-
ton, has caused friction between the United States and its allies, its presence does rep-
resent an obstacle to Cuba’s further reintegration into the current world economy. 
By the middle of 1994, the economic freefall continued and the Cuban economy 
and society seemed to be headed for disaster. In practice the ra tion was not providing 
enough for people to eat, and the amount of time spent in lines obtaining the basic 
necessities was further undermining the remaining economic production. Discontent 
with the economic situation boiled over during the summer of 1994 as several inci-
dents surrounding the hijacking of boats in Havana harbor brought out people in 
demonstrations against the government for the first time since 1959. However, ulti-
mately the Cuban leadership was successful in defusing the situation and beginning a 
slow turnaround of the economy that continues to the present day. The Cuban gov-
ernment opened up its ports in August 1994 and allowed thousands of discontented 
Cubans to go to the United States, where their arrival created a political crisis for 
President Bill Clinton. The crisis ended with a new immigration agreement between 
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the United States and Cuba in September 1994, and the United States ended its long-
standing policy of granting political asylum to all arriving Cuban refugees. Under the 
new pol icy, refugees reaching U.S. soil are still granted the right to apply for asy lum, 
but those intercepted at sea are returned to Cuba. A new agreement, signed in May 
1995, allows for the legal immigration of up to 20,000 Cubans per year to the United 
States. 
On the economic front, the Cuban government initiated a series of reforms that 
were designed to encourage private investment. The most important and successful 
project has been the reopening of private agricultural mar kets where the producers 
sell directly to the public. Begun in late 1994, these markets resulted in a better food 
situation for the average Cuban and also served to restore the value of the Cuban peso. 
Another important reform al lowed the licensing of a wide range of individual service 
businesses from tailors to barbers to small restaurants in private homes. A major eco-
nomic decision in 1993 allowed for the legalization of the dollar for use by the Cuban 
population as a whole. The circulation of the dollar had become too widespread for 
the government to ignore, so the decision was made to le galize it for the purposes 
of better control. It is now estimated that $600–$800 mil lion a year flows into the 
Cuban economy from Cubans living in the United States. Dollar legalization had a 
sound economic foundation, but the political and social ramifications have been nega-
tive. Pursuit of the dollar increases prostitution, overvalues jobs in the tourist sector, 
and priv ileges those in the society who have the good fortune to have relatives in the 
United States. 
The other aspect of Cuban economic recovery was the attraction of mod est amounts 
of foreign capital into Cuba’s main production areas of sugar and nickel mining. Al-
though the investments are small, they helped Cuba reverse its economic freefall, with 
a gain of 2.5 percent in 1995 followed by more substantial gains of 7.8 percent and 
4.5 percent in 1996 and 1997. Cuba’s growth rate slowed in 1998 to 1.2 percent but 
rebounded to a 6.2 percent gain in 1999. However, at this rate it will take Cuba an-
other decade to re turn to its economic position of the late 1980s. Despite the modest 
economic growth, the daily lives of the average Cuban revolve around obtaining the 
basic necessities of life. Waiting in long lines to obtain rationed food and commuting 
by bicycle or waiting for inconsistent public transportation cuts sharply into worker 
productivity, which must improve if the Cuban econ omy is to prosper. These difficul-
ties of life are not unique to Cuba, but what makes it an interesting place to study is 
that Cuba has gone through this dramatic crisis while trying to maintain its socialist 
principles. In Cuba, un like the former Communist countries in Europe, there is no 
full-scale em bracing of a market economy. In speech after speech Castro has reiter-
ated that Cuba will not return to a capitalist past. This has meant that the sacri fice 
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has been shared. The free medical and educational systems have been maintained. In 
part because there has been shared sacrifice, there has been no social explosion, which 
many predicted.
CONCLUSION
How is it to be understood that the Cuban revolution and its leader Fidel Castro 
have survived in power for forty years in the face of the almost unrelenting pressure 
from the United States? As the previous narrative has shown, Fidel Castro and the 
Cuban revolution have survived because they have tapped into the deep wellsprings of 
Cuban nationalism and desire for independence and because they have constructed in 
Cuba a society that improved the living conditions for a majority of Cubans through 
model programs in health care, education, housing, and food security. 
Not initially a socialist by ideology, Fidel Castro came to embrace socialism as the 
means to achieve Cuban independence and social justice, principles to which he ad-
hered from the beginning. His contribution to socialism comes in the area of praxis, 
not theory. As a leader, Castro has shown a considerable flexibility and willingness to 
admit to errors, traits generally not present in the socialist leaders of the last century. 
When the more idealistic approaches of the 1960s did not achieve all of their desired 
results, Castro accepted a place within the socialist COMECON and as a result in the 
1970s and 80s Cuba constructed a reasonably successful and just system with univer-
sal education and health care. When the USSR collapsed, most analysts predicted the 
quick demise of Cuba’s socialist project, but again the system adapted. By dramatically 
exploiting its comparative advantage in tourism and legalizing the receipt of hundreds 
of millions of dollars of remittances from Cuban-Americans in the United States, 
Cuba’s economy survived through the 1990s and by the new century was more eco-
nomically and politically independent than at any time in its history. 
It is unknown how much longer Fidel Castro will be able to continue leading the 
Cuban nation. As of this writing Fidel is in a Havana hospital and his full return to 
power seems unlikely. His brother Raul has been in formal control since July 31, 2006. 
Even before this illness, the day to day running of Cuba’s economic and political sys-
tem has been passed on to a new generation of leaders, people who were too young 
to have fought in the Sierra Maestra. The views of these leaders are not perceptibly 
different from older leadership, so the continuance of the revolutionary project under 
their guidance could be Fidel Castro’s greatest triumph.
Gary Prevost is Professor of Political Science.
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